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Abstract
The European Union is an unprecedented unification project that successfully preserves 
political peace and integrates Europe’s countries into a supra-national model. However, 
recent economic and political crises have shown that there are institutional problems that 
have undermined the EU and lost the trust of many citizens. In Italy after the ‘political 
earthquake’ of the 2013 national elections, the party system suffered a further shock in 
2018 with the consolidation of the centre-right and Five Star Movement as the main com-
peting political actors. In this context, the relationship with the EU has undergone numer-
ous tensions, impacting directly on Italian public opinion and its perception of European 
institutions. This paper investigates whether and how the ‘exit’ issue from the EU affects 
Italian citizens, particularly how they react to a UK-style hypothetical referendum on leav-
ing the EU. By analysing a 2019 voter study, it tries to identify clusters of Italian citizens 
by their attitude to European policies and a possible EU referendum.
Keywords Euroscepticism · Italy · Referendum · EES survey · CATPCA
1 Introduction
The European Union (EU) is currently encountering one of the most uncertain periods 
since its birth. Although the EU project has been very successful at maintaining political 
peace, recent crises have displayed the institution’s fragility.
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The EU’s economic vision, border protection and institutional legitimacy have become 
the main issues in Eurosceptic political strategies and they have consequently left their 
mark on public opinion (De Vries 2018).
In this context, although the UK is an outlier when it comes to exit scepticism (Hobolt 
2016) and there are different reasons why people would like to leave the EU in different 
countries (De Vries 2018; Ejrnæs and Jensen 2019, 2021), the UK’s 2016 vote to exit is the 
first real example shedding light on the consequences of the intensifying Eurosceptic senti-
ment (De Luca 2019). Since then, the fear of a likely ‘contagion’ in other countries (Walter 
2020, 2021) has persistently spread to the point of worrying Rome seriously.
Although the early years were characterised by strong public support in Italy towards 
European integration (Conti 2006; Isernia 2008), by the early 1990s Italian political parties 
had developed relevant Eurosceptic positions (Quaglia 2008, 2011).
A general decline in EU trust has occurred in the last decade. Still, the negative peaks in 
EU support have occurred with two acute crises (Harteveld et al. 2013; Dellmuth and Tall-
berg 2015; Isani and Schlipphak 2017; Conti et al. 2020b). First, after the 2010–2011 eco-
nomic crisis and the subsequent technocratic government, led by Mario Monti, the EU was 
‘blamed’ by Italians for the austerity measures realised against member states (Conti et al. 
2020a). Second, the 2015–2017 immigration crisis highlighted EU governance limitations 
in containing the enormous numbers of immigrant arrivals from Africa and the Middle 
East area. The asylum rules provided by the Dublin regulation quickly became, in Italian 
public perception, too expensive compared to the benefits of EU membership (Ambrosini 
1995; Dixon et al. 2018; Geddes and Pettrachin 2020).
Between these two crises, there was the ‘political earthquake’ of the 2013 national elec-
tions (Chiaramonte and Sio 2013); with the rise in the anti-establishment Five Star Move-
ment (M5S), the Italian party system changed from the bipolarity of the Second Republic 
into a tripolar system (Ceccarini and Bordignon 2016; Conti and Memoli 2015; Salvati 
2019).
A further violent shock in 2018 consolidated the M5S and the centre-right League as 
the main competing political actors. In this political context, M5S and the League struck an 
agreement forming the first coalition government which excluded the ‘mainstream’ parties, 
allowing them to mix several policies historically connected with both the right wing and 
the left. In just a few weeks during summer 2019, under Salvini’s leadership, the League 
revoked its support of the cabinet, provoking a government crisis that resulted in the for-
mation of a new cabinet between M5S and the Democratic Party (PD), led again by the PM 
Giuseppe Conte (Gattinara and Froio 2019; Salvati 2020).
In this new scenario, the position of the League became more critical for the EU in rela-
tion to pushing Italian public opinion to have more regard for national affairs. Moreover, 
new political forces have EU-exit agendas, such as ‘Italexit’, the new senator Gianluigi Par-
agone’s party. The economy, immigration and Covid-19 crises have proven to be real pres-
sure tests for the Brussels–Rome relationship. Trust in the EU seems to have deteriorated, 
raising concerns about possible severe consequences for the stability of EU countries. The 
most crucial factor that has been brought into play is that Eurosceptic positions now have a 
stronger voice than the pro-EU forces.
For this reason, the Italian public’s opinion towards this relationship is becoming more 
and more like a litmus test of the national elite’s consensus and its policy competition.
In order to understand these changes, the research question to pay close attention to is 
‘How will Italian citizens react in the face of a hypothetical referendum on exiting the EU 
modelled on the UK referendum?’.
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Although from a legal viewpoint the possibility of leaving the EU raises several con-
stitutional queries that the Brexit model does not solve—in particular, the prospect of a 
legal ‘Italexit’ no longer appears to be unimaginable (Miglio 2019). Moreover, even if at 
the moment ‘Italexit’ is not on the public opinion agenda, several scholars argue that today 
Italexit is not a completely theoretical possibility (Baccaro et al. 2020).1 For this reason, 
this paper’s aim is to evaluate the relationship between Eurosceptic attitudes in Italy and 
political phenomena such as a referendum on Italexit after the precipitation of the situa-
tion in the UK. Italexit is a term used to describe the possible exit of Europe’s third-largest 
economy from the EU (Fingleton 2020) as a solution to Italy’s economic and social issues, 
particularly related to immigration (Simionescu 2021).
To understand this topic, this paper analyses the European Election Studies (EES) Voter 
Study 2019 in addition to trying to identify clusters of Italian citizens according to their 
attitudes to European and national issues and a referendum with the option of leaving the 
EU.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first section analyses Euroscepticism in 
relation to public opinion. The second section presents the data and the method used to 
discuss the variable selection used in the categorical principal component analysis (CAT-
PCA). In the third section, the results of CATPCA are considered using the components 
involved in a cluster analysis of Italian citizens. The fourth section aims to understand the 
Italian approach to a referendum on exiting the EU. Finally, the fifth section comprises the 
conclusion.
2  Mass level Euroscepticism
A number of important recent surveys centred on the EU and essential attitudes towards 
EU institutions (i.e. Eurobarometer, EES, etc.) have enabled us to better understand public 
Euroscepticism. The factors that seem to power it include emotional reactions to national 
politics and institutions, fears about how an integration process may affect national iden-
tity, a dislike of supra-national institutions and utilitarianism based on personal interest 
(Hobolt and De Vries 2016).
Studies in the 1990s, in which individual cost-benefits encouraged explanations that 
depend on strong links between support for EU integration and greater affluence, focused 
on a utilitarian interpretation (Anderson and Reichert 1995; Gabel 1998). The EU was 
generally not seen as a major risk to each country’s national and cultural identity, under-
lining how the economic costs and benefits were vital in forming public opinion towards 
the European integration process (McLaren 2002, 2007). Europeans who believed in a 
strong economic future saw European integration positively and those who were more fear-
ful were also more Eurosceptic. Another key element in EU support is how educated citi-
zens are, as recent studies have found (Ejrnæs and Jensen 2021; Hakhverdian et al. 2013). 
Recent Eurozone studies demonstrate that where the economic cost–benefit is meaningful, 
there is a firmer utility aspect in public opinion (Hobolt and Wratil 2015). Others describe 
how economic conditions during the 2007–2010 global economic crisis and the ‘auster-
ity’ measures that resulted drove citizens’ attitudes towards the EU institutions (Gomez 
1 Several parties have discussed it in their electoral manifestos, such as the M5S with the promise of a ref-
erendum on the permanence of the euro in 2014 or the League in its 2018 and 2019 manifestos.
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2015). Economic factors such as unemployment and a higher interest rate therefore sug-
gest a high correlation with weaker levels of EU support. Furthermore, Europeans are now 
more responsive to economic issues as a result of the crisis, although this seems to be less 
visible in countries with intensive social policies than in those with fewer welfare protec-
tions (Anderson and Hecht 2014).
Although the determinants often complement each other (Garry and Tilley 2009; 
Hooghe 2007; Kuhn et al. 2014; McLaren 2007), national identity and political institutions 
have been key in accounting for public Euroscepticism (Serricchio et al. 2013). The idea of 
identity had already been defined a number of times as acting in contrast to economic fac-
tors (McLaren 2006). The supra-national model seems to dissolve national identity which 
leads citizens with a solid national identity to look at EU integration less positively (Carey 
2002; Hooghe and Marks 2004).
Support for national identity factors seemed to shift with a second pivotal moment. 
The European refugee crisis that peaked in 2015–2017 created a high level of tension on 
Europe’s borders upon displaying the inability of the EU to manage the emergency. Non-
economic factors, such as cultural/national identity and security, that immigration seemed 
to threaten, were directly linked to this situation. These are factors that, as we have seen, 
are likely to affect citizens’ attitude towards EU institutions (McLaren 2002). More widely, 
those who hold Eurosceptic views tend to show resentment towards immigrants (Vreese 
and Boomgaarden 2006). In addition, a narrow idea of a national/local identity is more 
likely to encourage a Eurosceptic position (Hooghe and Marks 2004).
Moreover, in southern member states, the 2015–2017 refugee crisis did increase citi-
zens’ distrust in the benefits of EU membership. In Italian public opinion, the Dublin regu-
lation’s asylum rules quickly became regarded as too expensive when weighed up against 
what the EU membership offered (Dixon et al. 2018; Geddes and Pettrachin 2020).
However, public opinion also seems easily swayed by the national political context 
(Hobolt and De Vries 2016). Indeed, the national context acts as a point of reference for 
the way that citizens assess EU integration. The EU integration process is so far from the 
reality of some citizens, according to a number of scholars, that these citizens formed their 
opinions about the EU through much closer trusted sources such as the media (Azrout et al. 
2012; De Vreese and Boomgaarden 2006; Hooghe 2003) or national politics (De Vries and 
Edwards 2009).
There are two principal ways to view the relationship between the national and Euro-
pean levels. In the first, scholars argue that citizens evaluate European integration using 
their countries’ institutions as their standard. Because of a lack of knowledge about EU 
institutions, national aspects assume more importance than European ones (Anderson 
1998). Citizens therefore develop attitudes towards the EU using nation-states as a proxy 
(Kritzinger 2003). In the second, the literature reveals that there is an inverse relation-
ship between national appraisal and support for the EU. Citizens who are disillusioned by 
the policies of their nation display stronger support for those of the EU and vice versa 
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2000). This system of standards also works with the quality of national 
democracy. Citizens who approvingly assess the democracy of their own country show less 
support for EU integration (Rohrschneider 2002).
Thus utilitarian, identitarian and national determinants each have a different impact 
on public Euroscepticism. Specific historical, economic or national contexts have lent 
some of the factors more power. Several scholars, furthermore, have argued that ’attitudes 
towards multiculturalism’ at the individual level and ‘corruption’ at the country level are 
the strongest Euroscepticism predictors (Ejrnæs and Jensen 2019). Moreover, recent stud-
ies revealed considerable cross-country variation as regards the exit from the EU, which 
Methods for analysing citizens’ attitudes: a hypothetical…
1 3
implies that motivations for leaving should be assessed on a country-by-country basis and 
that the anti-globalisation model is subsumed by anti-multiculturalism and anti-elite mod-
els (Ejrnæs and Jensen 2021). Covid-19 has various key implications which could affect 
the attitude towards the EU. Doubt has been voiced by several member states about how 
the EU institutions operate during an emergency. Among the countries most affected, for 
example Italy, scholars have observed that people have become more Eurosceptic because 
of how the virus has been handled as they feel that the EU institutions and other member 
states abandoned them (Russack and Blockmans 2020).
Some national governments have gained popularity during the Covid-19 crisis by 
frequently condemning the EU as being inadequate at facing the challenge. In addition, 
a number of countries attempted to assemble a bloc of solidaristic members against EU 
coronavirus decisions. This has affected the public’s opinion on EU membership, caus-
ing important alterations in their relationship with the EU (Bremer et  al. 2021). Several 
governments have backed the idea of future pledge referendums about EU issues, making 
the Covid-19 era a fascinating way to understand attitudes towards European integration by 
comparing attitudes before and afterwards.
Historically, national governments have generally committed to referendums on Euro-
pean issues despite not being required to do so. The political strategy behind these national 
pledges, driven almost fully by national policy linked to domestic issues, has been exam-
ined by scholars (Oppermann 2013).
In the past, some EU citizens have had the chance to vote in referendums on Euro-
pean integration. Over 50 referendums have taken place on European issues such as treaty 
reforms (Mendez et al. 2014). However, the place of EU referendums in the political bond 
between citizens and institutions can be seen in two different ways. Firstly, scholars have 
described how EU referendums are understood as second-order ballots on national politi-
cal issues (Franklin et al. 1995) and secondly, it has been argued that citizens’ choices are 
informed by their own attitude towards the EU (Hobolt 2009).
In this regard, this paper aims to understand Italians’ attitude towards the EU, in particu-
lar looking at their hypothetical choice of a referendum about the exit from the EU.
In order to understand this, the paper analyses the Eurosceptic component in all mem-
ber states to then focus on the specific Italian case. From this perspective, this study will 
analyse the EES survey dataset through the use of categorical principal component analysis 
(CATPCA). CATPCA has rapidly gained attention among scholars for the purpose of ana-
lysing categorical data (i.e. ordinal and nominal data). Similarly, this study applied CAT-
PCA to identify the component structure of the citizens’ attitudes by taking into account 
the ordinal and nominal nature of the data collected in the EES survey. This method 
allowed us to reduce the data containing significant variables into one or more components 
that can be used in other analyses.
3  Methods and analysis
This paper is based on the 2019 European Election Study (EES) Voter Study conducted 
in all 28 EU member states after the election to the European Parliament (Schmitt et al. 
2020). The post-electoral survey consists of more than 100 items. It was conducted by Gal-
lup International and the data collection was mostly conducted online. The respondents 
were selected randomly from access panel databases using stratification variables. The 
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sample size was roughly 1000 interviews in each EU member state (except for Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and Malta where the sample size was 500). The total sample size was 26,538.
The analysis presented in this study considered 21 variables of the EES dataset 
(Table 1), taking into account five aspects: (a) the national politics focus (Q3, Q5, Q16, 
Q18_1, Q19 and Q20), (b) EU politics focus (Q4, Q18_2, Q22, Q23 and Q28), (c) the 
citizens’ attitude towards general policy issues (from Q14_1 to Q14_6), (d) the citizens’ 
attitudes towards politics (Q8, Q21) and (e) the sociodemographic aspect (HAGE & D11).
The study considered the whole sample of 26,538 starting cases which was subsequently 
reduced to 16,546. Regarding the Italian case, the sample reduced from 1000 cases to 716.2
In summary, this analysis aims to identify the set of indicators for the dimensions relat-
ing to the attitudes of Italian citizens in the EES sample towards national and EU issues 
and politics in general; to test the validity of the structure of the dimensions identified; to 
hypothesise the different citizens’ profiles through a cluster analysis; and to evaluate the 
significance of the clusters in relation to both sociographic and political variables before 
finally testing the impact of the ‘Italexit’ referendum. In particular, the significance of these 
explanatory factors will be explored in the EU-exit context, such as Brexit, which can be 
considered a case of ‘exit scepticism’ (De Vries 2018) or ‘hard Euroscepticism’ (Ejrnæs 
and Jensen 2021).
Upon analysing the dataset, CATPCA is used to identify the components underlying the 
set of qualitative and ordinal observed variables. The main objectives when choosing CAT-
PCA for the analysis of the data concerned involve (a) a reduction in the data complexity, 
(b) the exploration of the relationships between the 21 variables observed and (c) the iden-
tification of the underlying latent structure.
CATPCA uses optimal scaling procedures to ‘enhance’ the qualitative variables, allow-
ing for the application of the analysis of the main components. For each type of nominal 
(dummy) and ordinal variable observed (with the order of the modes preserved), the values 
for the structure have a monotonic function, aiming to maximise the variance between the 
alternative modes given certain assumptions.
The analysis presents a number of iterations equal to 100, satisfying Cronbach’s Alpha 
levels (the highest reaches 0.798 with over 19% of variance explained). There are six com-
ponents to be extracted by applying the Kaiser rule. This was checked using eigenvalues 
through parallel analysis (Horn 1965) which reports six components and the use of the 
Scree plot with four components (Table 2). 
The outcome of the analysis suggests that the best solution is a five-component one 
that is to be assessed through the interpretation of the factor coefficients. Subsequently, we 
applied an oblique rotation method (e.g. Promax) by admitting that there is a possible cor-
relation of the components/factors with each other (due to the similarity of some of the var-
iables). Bartlett’s test is significant (p = 0.000) and the KMO index (Kaiser–Meyer–Olkin 
Measure of Sampling Adequacy) is equal to 0.773. Therefore the factorial model is ade-
quate enough to use to analyse the data. Regarding the communities (which indicate the 
2 To obtain an optimal CATPCA, the sample was reduced for the following reasons: (1) the items related 
to the questions presented an interval scale of several points from 2 to 11 beyond ’don’t know’ and missing 
values; (2) it eliminated the cases where the ’don’t know’ mode and the missing values were present as they 
constitute a problem in the statistical approach adopted (variables that could not be ordered); (3) the choice 
led to ’purifying’ the dataset of total cases compared to the original, making the variables ’ordinal’; (4) for 
the remaining 16,546, a CATPCA was applied with optimal scaling to transform the ordinal variables into 
metrics; (5) a cluster analysis was conducted on the factors identified and (6) the bivariate analysis used 
sociopolitical variables to examine the issue of the possible referendum on the exit from the EU.
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part of the variance of the individual indicators which remains explained by the factorial 
model despite the reduction of the ‘p’ components and the consequent loss of informa-
tion), for almost all the indicators, the value is above the critical threshold of 0.50. In fact, 
the five-component extraction shows that 53.2% of the variance is explained in cumulative 
terms.
From a first analysis of the pattern coefficient matrix (Table  3), the five-component 
solution does not show relevant cross-loading. The first component seems to represent 
the Eurosceptic claims with a strong and negative representation of all variables focused 
at European level: EU membership is a bad thing, no trust in the EU institutions or how 
they work in general and a better perspective of the UK after the Brexit referendum. To 
these variables is added active and full support of a restrictive policy on immigration. The 
second component seems to be better focused on the national perspective of a pessimistic 
vision of domestic economic trends related to the past and future. Moreover, this compo-
nent involves more unfavourable perceptions about the government’s results and no trust 
in the National Parliament. The third component is more focused on the highest level of 
interest in politics and the capacity to collect more political information in a country that 
is governed democratically. The last two components are slightly interpenetrating through 
some of the cross-loading values. Despite this, the fourth component seems to be closer to 
a conservativevision in terms of the four critical aspects: being of a higher age, full sup-
port of the restriction of privacy rights in order to combat crime, an opposition to same-sex 
marriage and the belief in the importance of economic growth against environmental pro-
tection. The last component is more focused on financial aspects such as the opposition to 
the state’s intervention in the economy and the redistribution of wealth from the rich to the 
poor. This component represents the highest level of a family’s standard of living.
The five components have been renamed in the following way: Euroscepticism (1), 
National pessimism (2), Knowledgeability (3), Conservatism (4) and Economic liberalism 
(5).
The factorial scores obtained and standardised were used for cluster analysis. In this 
case, a k-means cluster analysis with PCA factors as the input was used to identify the pro-
files of European citizens concerning their attitude towards the aspects analysed before. This 
type of analysis allows us to maximise the similarity between the elements inside the groups 
and the dissimilarity between the groups. In other words, the k-average (non-hierarchical) 
Table 2  Model summary
a Total Cronbach’s Alpha is based on the total eigenvalue
Source EES Voter Study 2019 (Schmitt et al. 2020)
Dimension Cronbach’s alpha Variance accounted for
Total (eigenvalue) % of variance
1 .798 4.168 19.849
2 .582 2.245 10.691
3 .514 1.960 9.336
4 .409 1.638 7.801
5 .156 1.175 5.596
6 .018 1.017 4.843
7 − .119 .898 4.275
Total .970a 13.102 62.391
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method enables us to maximise the internal and external variance (in and between groups). 
It is defined a priori as a cluster range (from 2 to 7) taking into consideration the values of 
the F test, the interpretability of the clusters based on the final centres of the groups (i.e. the 
averages of the clusters concerning the grouping variables), the number of clusters and their 
homogeneity and the calculation of each Pseudo-F.
Based on the evaluation criteria, the most reliable solutions were for two, three and four 
clusters. Pseudo-F has decreasing values (cluster 2 = 3704.57; cluster 3 = 3809.58; cluster 
4 = 3523.93). A four-cluster solution was opted for while taking into account its higher homo-
geneity than the other two. Table 4 shows the four clusters identified. 
Cluster 1 shows a higher sensitivity towards the ‘Knowledgeability’ component (score 
0.30, positive) and little relevance to the ‘Conservatism’ aspect (score 1.26, negative). This 
cluster is defined as ‘Progressive’.
Cluster 2 shows sensitivity towards the ‘Conservatism’ component (score 0.73, posi-
tive) but in this case, there is also the ‘Knowledgeability’ component (score 0.64, positive), 
although it is less sensitive towards the ‘Euroscepticism’ component (score -0.58, negative). 
This cluster is defined as ‘Moderate’.
Cluster 3 shows a keen sensitivity towards the ‘Economic liberalism’ component (score 
0.90, positive) and a weak relationship with the ‘Knowledgeability’ component (− 0.79). This 
cluster is defined as ‘Homo economicus’.
Finally, Cluster 4 shows a keen sensitivity towards the ‘Euroscepticism’ component (stand-
ardised score of 1.44, positive, the highest value among the four clusters) and also, although 
as not high as the European level, a negative domestic vision (score 0.88, positive, the highest 
among the three clusters). It does not seem as interested in the ‘Economic liberalism’ compo-
nent (− 0.48). This cluster is defined as the ‘Eurosceptic’ cluster.
At this point of the analysis, the data was based only on the Italian case and the four clus-
ters identified were analysed using some of the essential descriptive variables present in the 
EES questionnaire: sociographic (age, education, area of origin and social class), political 
(left–right and the probability of voting for a party) and position on the exit referendum.
Table 4  Final cluster centres
Source EES Voter Study 2019 (Schmitt et al. 2020)
Cluster
1 2 3 4
Euroscepticism − .48716 − .58981 − .00603 1.44578
National pessimism − .04744 − .27357 − .26839 .88969
Knowledgeability .30279 .64235 − .79955 − .13735
Conservatism − 1.26206 .73406 − .11376 .25716
Liberalism − .46009 − .25177 .90357 − .48851
Number of cases in each cluster 3249 5204 4855 3238
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4  The Italian approach to the EU
The identification of the four clusters allows us to analyse the Italian case in more depth 
in order to understand how the attitudes of Italian citizens are oriented to the dimensions 
explored in this study. Table 5 presents a bivariate analysis of the four clusters concern-
ing the two types of variables. First, the sociographic group of variables, such as gender, 
level of education and the urban–rural dimension, represent the social class of belonging. 
Second, there is the group of political variables such as left–right self-placement, the prob-
ability of voting for one of the leading Italian parties and finally the vote for the Italexit 
referendum.
As for the first group of variables, there is no significant difference in relation to the 
gender variable except for the ‘Progressive’ cluster which has a slight female majority 
(50.3%). It has also been seen (see Tables 3 and 4) how age is used as a metric variable 
within the model that has characterised the ‘Conservatism’ component positively and the 
‘Economic liberalism’ component negatively. Consequently, the relative clusters built on 
the five components are identified by age; the group ‘Moderate’ involves older people and 
the ‘Homo economicus’ group involves younger people. Furthermore, age influences the 
other two groups, albeit to a lesser extent. The ‘Progressive’ group is composed of a group 
of younger citizens while the ‘Eurosceptic’ group is populated by older people.










Total (N = 716)
Male 49.7 54.9 52.1 53.6 52.8
Female 50.3 45.1 47.9 46.4 47.2
15 years and less (= ̒ low’) 2.6 13.4 8.3 10.7 9.2
16–19 years (= ̒ medium’) 41.9 42.9 40.2 57.7 45.5
20 + (= ̒ high’) 40.6 41.5 40.2 31.5 38.7
still studying 2.6 1.3 2.4 0.0 1.5
N/A 12.3 0.9 8.9 0.0 5.0
Rural area or village 13.5 15.6 16.0 14.3 14.9
Small or middle-sized town 50.3 56.3 47.3 54.8 52.5
Large town 36.1 28.1 36.7 31.0 32.5
Working class 7.1 7.1 10.1 14.9 9.6
Lower middle class 27.1 20.1 18.9 32.7 24.3
Middle class 51.0 60.7 56.8 44.0 53.8
Upper middle class 10.3 11.6 9.5 7.7 9.9
Upper class 1.9 0.4 3.0 0.0 1.3
Other 2.6 0.0 1.8 0.6 1.1
Left 29.7 11.6 2.4 4.8 11.7
Centre-left 33.5 22.3 16.0 11.3 20.7
Centre 11.6 17.9 20.1 16.7 16.8
Centre-right 15.5 30.8 44.4 24.4 29.2
Right 6.5 14.7 11.2 34.5 16.8
Don’t know 3.2 2.7 5.9 8.3 4.9
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In terms of education, two critical aspects have emerged from the data. The first con-
cerns the ‘Progressive’ group that is mainly anchored to the ‘Knowledgeability’ factorial 
component which has the lowest level of ‘low education’ (2.6%) and consequently the 
highest percentage in the medium–high levels. The second concerns the ‘Eurosceptic’ 
cluster which presents the lowest percentage of ‘highly’ schooled citizens (31.5%). So far 
as professions are concerned, the highest rate of people in the working class (14.9%) and 
lower middle class (32.7%) are recorded in the ‘Eurosceptic’ group. At the same time, the 
‘Progressive’, ‘Moderate’ and ‘Homo economicus’ clusters present with population groups 
belonging to the medium–upper classes. In the urban–rural dimension, all clusters show 
other interesting details. The ‘Progressive’ and ‘Homo economicus’ groups mainly belong 
to middle- to large-sized towns while the ‘Moderate’ and ‘Eurosceptic’ groups belong to 
middle- to small-sized towns or rural areas.
Regarding the political variables, there is a higher placement of citizens close to the left 
and centre-left areas in the ‘Progressive’ cluster, gradually passing through the ‘Moder-
ate’ and ‘Homo economicus’ groups that are more representative of the central areas of 
the left–right self-placement in order to get to the ‘Eurosceptic’ group in a centre-right 
or extreme right position. Consequently, the propensity to vote for one of the seven par-
ties in the EES survey also varies according to the cluster and ideological self-placement 
(Table 6). For this reason, the table shows that for each political party, the data relating 
to the average values have been recorded by each cluster on a scale ranging from 0 to 10 
where 0 indicates no probability of voting for that party and 10 certain probability. In this 
regard, the ‘Progressive’ group has a high likelihood of supporting the centre-left parties 
(i.e. 7.2 for PD or 4.8 for the Left party ‘Sinistra’). The ‘Moderate’ group seems to be very 
supportive of the positions of both the PD (8.8) and the League (8.5) while the ‘Homo 
economicus’ group are ‘Eurosceptic’ and firmly centred on the League (i.e. 8.2 and 9.2). In 
short, Salvini’s League registers in three of the four groups a higher probability of gaining 
the vote.
The last variable indicates the position of the clusters in the face of a hypothetical referen-
dum on exiting the EU (Table 7). Overall, the Italian sample highlights a clear majority for the 
‘remain’ position with a higher percentage in the ‘Progressive’ and ‘Moderate’ groups at 83.9 
and 86.6% respectively. However, two aspects seem relevant to better understanding the hypo-
thetical referendum. First, despite the fact that the majority in the ‘Homo economicus’ group 
are focused on the ‘remain’ position (55.6%), it is important to show how the group represents 
the highest percentage of people who are likely to vote for neither of the two views (26%). 
This is possible due to having both inadequate information about the EU and how it works 
and self-interest based mainly on economic convenience. These factors influence the decision 









Total (N = 716)
PD 7.2 8.8 6.3 1.5 5.9
FI 2.3 5.7 6.1 3.7 4.5
League 2.6 8.5 8.2 9.2 7.2
M5S 4.6 6.9 7.7 6.6 6.5
Sinistra 4.8 3.9 4.5 1.0 3.6
 + Europa 5.6 5.8 5.7 1.2 4.6
FdI 2.0 6.6 6.2 5.7 5.1
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to stay in the EU until the benefits outweigh the costs. The risk is that a reversed trend may 
follow a change in this as yet uncrystallised position. Second, there is an evident prevalence 
of the ‘leave’ position in the ‘Eurosceptic’ group (70.8%). The data indeed allows for explor-
ing the ‘hard/exit scepticism’ explained by De Vries (2018) and Ejrnæs and Jensen (2021). In 
brief, in a group characterised mainly by the ‘hard/exit scepticism’ factor, the choice to remain 
within the EU (18.5%) seems to overlap with an idea of a softer Euroscepticism.
The other groups also present as having a significant percentage of citizens willing to leave 
the EU. In this case, it is not the Eurosceptic component that guides their ideas but either the 
ideological dimension or the economic one.
To summarise, the ‘Progressive’ group is characterised by a more significant female pres-
ence and high levels of education, well-heeled and residing in large urbanised centres. This 
cluster tends to vote for centre-left parties with a higher percentage of the vote supportive 
of remaining a member of the EU. The moderate cluster is concentrated in medium urban-
ised areas and it is composed of the middle class with an average income. It is self-placed in 
mainly centrist ideological positions and does not disdain cross-voting for both the PD and the 
League despite having the highest percentage of people who are pro-EU membership. The 
‘Homo economicus’ cluster is divided between the rural area and the large-sized town; it is 
mainly centre-right and it is close to the League and M5S positions. It is generally in favour 
of staying in the EU but it also has the highest percentage of people who are not likely to take 
part in the event of a referendum.
Finally, there is the ‘Eurosceptic’ cluster with the lowest levels of education and the most 
moderate incomes who are residents in the peripheral areas of the country far from centre-left 
political views and, above all, oriented to the League’s position. It is possible to analyse the 
clear negative position against Europe. However, a percentage of people in this cluster are 
likely to vote to remain in the EU.
5  Conclusion
This study aims to understand how Euroscepticism takes root in Italian citizens and how 
they are likely to react in the face of a hypothetical referendum on leaving the EU based on 
the model of the one held in the UK.












Total (N = 716)
Remain a member of the EU 83.9 86.6 55.6 18.5 62.7
Leave the EU 10.3 9.4 18.3 70.8 26.1
Neither remain nor leave, of which: 5.8 4.0 26.0 10.7 11.2
 You would submit a blank ballot 
paper
2.6 1.3 11.8 0.6 3.9
 You would spoil the ballot paper 1.9 0.0 5.3 1.2 2.0
 You would not vote 0.6 0.0 2.4 3.6 1.5
 You are not eligible to vote 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.3
 Don’t know 0.0 2.7 6.5 4.8 3.5
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While the UK is considered an outlier regarding the exit from the EU (Hobolt 2016), 
recent studies have highlighted how there are different paths to the exit from the EU among 
countries and that anti-multiculturalism and anti-establishment factors have an explanatory 
power to account for Euroscepticism in Italy (Ejrnæs and Jensen 2021).
This implies that assumptions about a hypothetical Italexit must be considered sensitive 
to the heterogeneity of these results instead of assuming that the same set of causes could 
influence all other member states equally, although this kind of analysis could be tested in 
future for all others.
The results, indeed, highlight that the ‘Euroscepticism’ component contains a piece of 
clear evidence in relation to the sample analysed. Often it is associated with a negative 
vision of the national politics and it is opposed to the ‘Knowledgeability’ and ‘Conserva-
tism’ components. It seems not to display sensitivity to the ‘Economic liberalism’ com-
ponent (see Table 4). Consequently, the ‘Euroscepticism’ component appears to define a 
whole cluster of Eurosceptic people with a hard (or softer) scepticism approach, although 
this cluster is smaller than the others and also has national aspects. Moreover, observing 
the UK experience allows Italians to better evaluate the feasibility and advantage of an 
EU withdrawal. Recent studies show how more positive withdrawal experiences encour-
age exit-support abroad, whereas negative experiences are likely to deter (Walter 2020). 
These contagion effects impact EU membership and its long‐term stability, increasing the 
Eurosceptic view if the perception of Brexit negotiations is as being positive for the UK, 
allowing the development of a blueprint that makes it easier for countries to leave the EU 
in the future (Walter 2021).
The specific Italian case has a ‘Eurosceptic’ cluster defined by low levels of education, 
a rural area of origin, a lower middle social class and being close to the centre-right posi-
tion, in particular the League. This profile shows that the M5S has lost attractiveness as a 
Eurosceptic political reference. But why? One important reason was that Salvini’s League 
prevailed in two crucial issues, one of which is very relevant and essential to the Euroscep-
tic component. The first is the synergy between immigration and security which he trusts 
more than other Italian politicians. Second, Salvini has always been perceived as the pro-
tector of Italian interests and as a proponent of ‘Italy first’. This is a component that is very 
relevant in the ‘national pessimism’ analysed in this study. Moreover, Salvini is an expe-
rienced politician who has dominated the government and now dominates the opposition. 
His attention is mainly focused on the possibility of gaining government positions again. 
At the moment, the League of Salvini is influential in Italy.
In this context, the tension between the government and opposition has focused on the 
EU issue. The League, M5S and also the FdI have tried to characterise themselves in the 
EU as the defenders of the Italian people, threatened from above by the elites and from 
below by many dangerous ‘others’, especially immigrants. The parties are trying to show 
that they have an international political role. Each political party represents an alternative 
to the other, thinking that their time has come and believing that they are part of a wave 
that will sweep the world and change both politics and its actors.
In this state of political competition, the Italexit referendum still seems to be a distant 
danger. The majority appears to be oriented towards a ‘remain’ vote with two significant 
clusters, ‘Progressive’ and ‘Moderate’, almost entirely in favour of this. Something is miss-
ing at the ‘Economic liberalism’ cluster level where it is no coincidence that M5S reaches 
the highest level of representation. Somehow it seems that the confusion within the party 
that has manifested in recent years concerning the relationship with the EU also seems to 
have had repercussions on a slice of the population that has looked at the movement care-
fully. Finally, the ‘Eurosceptic’ cluster is almost entirely driven by ‘leavers’, demonstrating 
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that this position has settled in a part of the population and that it will be essential to moni-
tor in future studies.
New forms of anti-politics and populism, sometimes related to each other and at other 
times not, with a high level of distrust in politics or the EU and its manifestations, have 
taken on a karstic trend. This involves running underground and emerging periodically 
with explicit reference to particularly deplorable events and focusing on the behaviours of 
the parties, the political class or EU institutions, leaving space for the affirmation of atti-
tudes of despair or anger that find root in a possible referendum on leaving the EU as the 
(vain) solution to all problems.
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